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ethical, moral, individual, societal, 
and policy issues surrounding AI. It is 
the book’s discussion of the enduring 
nature of these issues that will be of 
value and greatest significance to 
the national-security community.
THOMAS CULORA
Six Victories: North Africa, Malta, and the Medi-
terranean Convoy War, November 1941–March 
1942, by Vincent P. O’Hara. Annapolis, MD: Na-
val Institute Press, 2019. 322 pages. $34.95.
In his latest book, Vincent P. O’Hara 
adds to his previous works on the 
Mediterranean during World War 
II by analyzing the period between 
November 1941 and March 1942. He 
considers six decisive actions that 
changed the tide of the naval war in 
the Middle Sea, three of which went 
in favor of the British (the actions of 
Force K, the battle of Cape Bon, and the 
first battle of Sirte [Sidra]) and three 
in favor of the Italians (Alexandria, the 
loss of Force K, and second Sirte).
The author’s detailed narrative reminds 
the reader that the Mediterranean 
war was one of naval attrition around 
the sea-lanes crossing the theater.
An essential question in Six Victories 
is the influence of intelligence on 
naval operations. According to O’Hara, 
while ULTRA provided critical data on 
many occasions, information often 
was untimely and was offset by Italian 
counterintelligence. O’Hara’s thesis is 
not entirely new; Italy’s leading scholar 
working on ULTRA, Alberto Santoni, 
reached similar conclusions in his 1981 
study Il vero traditore, which is not 
among the author’s references. O’Hara 
claims that the higher ratio of Axis 
attacks against British convoys dem-
onstrates that ULTRA did not affect the 
operations significantly. The argument 
is captious, since possessing intelligence 
does not mean necessarily that it is 
possible for one to attack; that possibility 
was reduced severely for Britain in the 
latter three of the “six victories.” How-
ever, when the British had the means, as 
during the operations of Force K, ULTRA 
allowed them to maximize the effective-
ness of their limited forces, which were 
numerically inferior to the enemy’s 
and had fewer bases available to them 
in the central Mediterranean. Finally, 
the British ratio of success for attacked 
convoys was better than that of the Axis.
Six Victories also puts great emphasis 
on the consequences of the three Italian 
victories. The destruction of Force K 
ended a nightmare period for the Italian 
convoys, while Alexandria allowed the 
Axis to achieve preeminence in the 
central Mediterranean. The pinnacle 
was the second Sirte battle, defined as an 
Italian victory—correctly reversing the 
judgment of some British naval histori-
ans. Also, according to O’Hara, the battle 
proved that the Italian surface fleet was a 
credible deterrent, discouraging further 
British attempts to resupply Malta (p. 
254). Yet while the author’s conclusion 
that second Sirte was an Axis victory is 
persuasive as far as the destruction of the 
enemy convoy goes, it is not so with re-
spect to its consequences. The action did 
not discourage further British attempts 
to resupply Malta; instead, it encouraged 
the Royal Navy to think that light surface 
forces were sufficient to meet the Italian 
fleet, preparing the way for the disaster 
of HARPOON-VIGOROUS in June 1942.
Here the major shortcoming of 
the book becomes apparent: not 
putting the Italian actions into the 
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broader context of the Mediterranean 
naval war. If that war’s object was 
communications, the Germans 
achieved the majority of the tactical 
successes that produced operational 
and strategic consequences. Even 
according to O’Hara’s data, 82 percent 
of Allied losses during the period of 
Six Victories resulted from German 
actions (p. 259). Second Sirte is a 
clear example of this; the delay the 
Italian surface forces imposed was 
not decisive, because it was German 
aircraft that sank the enemy ships. 
Despite this, O’Hara concludes that 
the three Italian victories led to 
Axis maritime control of the central 
Mediterranean up to November 1942, 
broken only by the coming of Ameri-
can naval reinforcements (p. 257).
This conclusion is not convincing. 
First, it seems to confound surface 
predominance with maritime control. 
During summer–fall 1942, intelligence, 
air, and underwater predominance—
critical elements of maritime control 
during World War II—were in the 
hands of the British, enabling them to 
disrupt Axis communications despite 
enemy surface predominance. Second, 
this trend already was emerging 
during the first period considered 
by Six Victories (fall 1941). Current 
Anglo-American and Italian scholarly 
work agrees that the increased security 
of Axis transports during early 1942 
depended on the decline of Malta as an 
operative base, itself caused by increas-
ing German air attacks. O’Hara seems 
unable to shake this argument, because 
he only identifies a chronological con-
nection in the improved situation of 
the Axis convoys after the three Italian 
victories (p. 127), possibly mistaking 
correlation for causation. Surface 
preponderance, the main result of the 
Italian victories, could not stop air and 
submarine attacks against Axis con-
voys, Britain’s primary weapons against 
enemy communications, which indeed 
regained their momentum when Ger-
man airpower shifted from the central 
Mediterranean to assist Rommel.
In conclusion, O’Hara’s book offers a 
detailed reconstruction of the naval 
actions described, deserving credit 
for proving that the effectiveness of 
the Italian navy at a tactical level was 
better than Anglo-American studies 
usually have acknowledged. Less 
convincing is the analysis of the 
operational and strategic consequences 
of the six “victories,” owing to an over-
emphasis on surface warfare, which 
was only a part—and possibly not the 
most important one—of the Mediter-
ranean naval scenario in 1941–42. 
Readers searching this book for lessons 
relevant to modern antiaccess warfare 
will need to bear this in mind.
FABIO DE NINNO
On War and Politics: The Battlefield inside Wash-
ington’s Beltway, by Arnold L. Punaro, with Da-
vid Poyer. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2016. 249 pages. $29.95.
On War and Politics is a remarkable 
autobiography. It explores the life 
and professional careers of Arnold L. 
Punaro, a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 
(USMCR) major general and congres-
sional insider; it also is a remarkable 
portrayal of the day-to-day workings 
of Congress and the Pentagon, so it 
will appeal to a broad range of readers 
interested in national-security affairs. 
Punaro spent over thirty-five years as 
a USMCR officer and worked closely 
with the chairman of the Senate Armed 
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